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Abstract
We prove that deﬁning consumers’ preferences over budget sets is both
necessary and suﬃcient to make every fully informative and ﬁnite set
of observed consumption choices rationalizable by a collection of pref-
erences which are transitive, complete, and monotone with respect to
own consumption. Our ﬁnding has two important theoretical conse-
quences. First, assuming that preferences depend on budget sets is
illegitimate under the scientiﬁc commitments of revealed preference
theory. Second, as long as consumers’ preferences are not deﬁned over
budget sets, we can assume that preferences depend on observable ob-
jects other than own consumption without compromising the logical
possibility to reject the model against observation. We however point
out that, despite this logical possibility, in practice it can be almost
impossible to reject a model where preferences are deﬁned over objects
that depend on budget sets. As an example of this we show that if
preferences are deﬁned over consumption choices of other individuals
then rationalization fails only in cases of negligible practical interest.
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11 Introduction
The economic literature has repeatedly suggested that consumers’ prefer-
ences can possibly depend on prices.1 However, so far no systematic analysis
has been conducted on the legitimacy of assuming price-dependent prefer-
ences under the scientiﬁc commitments of revealed preference theory. In
other words, it is not yet fully clear if assuming that preferences depend on
prices is compatible with the desideratum that observed consumption be-
haviors are not necessarily consistent with the hypothesis of rational choice.
In the present paper we investigate this issue by studying the rationaliz-
ability of consumers choices under the assumption that preferences depend
on budget sets – the latter being the natural generalization of the assump-
tion of price-dependent preferences to the case of non-linear budget sets (see
e.g., Forges and Minelli, 2009). As in Afriat (1967) we suppose to observe a
fully informative but ﬁnite set of consumer choices and we derive under what
conditions observations are consistent with rational choice. Diﬀerently from
Afriat’s model, we do not constraint preferences to depend on consumption
only, but we allow for the possibility that preferences depend on any observ-
able object. The relevance of this generalization – which goes well beyond
the consideration of price-dependent preferences – is discussed below.
Our main ﬁnding is that assuming preferences to depend on budget sets
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for making every fully informative
and ﬁnite set of observed consumption choices rationalizable by a collection
of preferences which are transitive, complete, and monotone with respect to
own consumption. This result has two important consequences. First, un-
der the assumption that preferences depend on budget sets the hypothesis of
rational choice cannot be logically refuted by observed behavior. Therefore,
assuming that individuals’ preferences are price-dependent is methodolog-
ically illegitimate under the scientiﬁc commitments of revealed preference
theory. Second, assuming that individuals do not care about budget sets is
suﬃcient to obtain that observed behavior can possibly refute the hypothe-
sis of rational choice. Since this result holds in a general framework where
preferences can depend on any observable object, we can conclude that let-
ting preferences depend on observable objects other than own consumption
is legitimate provided that we maintain price-independence.
Of course, the logical possibility of refuting the hypothesis of rational
choice does not imply the practical possibility to do so. Therefore, great
1For instance, economic agents may be interested in relative prices because they confer
social status (Veblen, 1899) or because they are interpreted as an indication of quality
(Scitovsky, 1944). The implications of price-dependent preferences for consumer demand
theory and welfare theory have been investigated in a few famous contributions (Kalman,
1968; Ng, 1987; Pollak, 1977, 1978). More recently, the possibility of price-dependent
preferences has been considered suﬃciently important to justify the study of how it aﬀects
the equilibrium property of general equilibrium models (Balasko, 2003).
2caution has to be had in assuming that preferences depend on objects other
than own consumption. We substantiate this warning with an example
where we show that if preferences are assumed to depend on the choices
made by other individuals, then the hypothesis of rational choice can be
refuted only in cases of negligible practical interest. In other words, our ex-
ample shows that allowing preferences to depend on objects which, in turn,
depend on budget sets may not be safe from a methodological standpoint.
In our opinion this is a relevant issue since the hypothesis of “interdepen-
dent preferences” – i.e., dependent on others’ choices – is gaining a certain
consensus among economists (see e.g., Frank, 2005; Hopkins and Kornienko,
2004; Clark et al., 2008, and references therein).
A similar warning has been recently advanced by Carvajal (2009) who
shows that the hypothesis of consumption externalities in competitive equi-
libria has testable implications, but admits that in practice carrying out a
test could be an extremely hard task. We stress that, despite similar con-
clusions on practical testability, there is a substantial diﬀerence between our
model and the one analyzed by Carvajal. In Carvajal (2009) consumption
behavior is restricted by general equilibrium conditions which in our model
are absent. Therefore, if we particularize our general ﬁnding about logical
testability of rational behavior – i.e., price-independent preferences are suf-
ﬁcient for logical testability – to the case of consumption externalities, then
we get a result which is stronger than Carvajal’s one since it is obtained
under fewer restrictions on behavior. At the same time, our warning on
practical testability should be interpreted in a weaker sense since we do not
consider restrictions on behavior which, if we observe competitive equilibria,
could be available.
The present study is related to the stream of contributions regarding
the rationalizability of observed choice (see e.g., Richter, 1966; Afriat, 1967;
Matzkin, 1991; Varian, 1982, 2006; Forges and Minelli, 2009). One diﬀerence
with respect to most papers belonging to this stream is that, in considering
the issue of rationalizability by means of a preference ordering, we disregard
the issue of representability of such an ordering by means of a utility func-
tion (see Chambers and Echenique, 2009, for an approach similar to ours).
A more substantial diﬀerence is that we study rationalizability in the gen-
eral case where individuals’ preferences are deﬁned over sets of non-choice
objects and not only over the choice set of individuals. In this regard, our
paper contributes to the literature by developing an original model where
individuals may care about a countably inﬁnite number of non-choice ob-
jects.
One further diﬀerence with respect to the traditional approach to ratio-
nalizability of consumer choices is that we focus on the behavior of many
individuals. This is a natural generalization in our setting since preferences
may be deﬁned over the behavior of other individuals and, hence, fully
informative observations have to contain information about everybody’s
3choices. Other contributions on rationalizability have considered the be-
havior of more than one individual. Brown and Matzkin (1996) investigates
the testable implications of competitive general equilibria in a Walrasian
setting. Their model has been recently extended to a game theoretic setup
by Deb (2009) and to the case of externalities and public goods by Carvajal
(2009). As anticipated above, although we share with these contributions
the focus on a population of individuals, diﬀerently from them we do not
consider equilibrium restrictions on behavior. As a result, our positive ﬁnd-
ings about testable implications are stronger.
The seminal work of Chiappori (1988) on the collective model of house-
hold consumption has inspired a series of contributions focusing on the ratio-
nal consumption behavior of group of individuals (see e.g., Cherchye et al.,
2008, and references therein). In particular, the recent paper by Cherchye
et al. (2010) studies the rationalizability of collective consumption choices
and provides a collective version of the results found in Afriat (1967). The
perspective on the problem of rationalizability, however, is quite diﬀerent
from ours as attention is given to the problem of missing information about
how consumption is allocated inside the group considered – e.g., the house-
hold. Indeed, the main diﬀerence between models of rational collective con-
sumption behavior and our model is that in the former observations are not
fully informative. In particular, while quantities consumed by the group
as a whole are observable, it is impossible to distinguish among quantities
privately consumed by each group member and between private and public
consumption inside the group. In other terms, the rationalizability studied
in these models moves from the idea of limited information availability while
here we consider the ideal case of full information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the mathematical
preliminaries. Section 3 describes the model and adapts the standard idea
of preference revelation to the case where individuals may also care about
any number of non-choice objects. Section 4 deﬁnes rationalizability in our
framework and provides the main results. Section 5 brieﬂy concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let R be a binary relation on a set W,w h e r ewRw￿ means that (w,w￿) ∈ R.
The existence of a sequence {wk}K+1
k=1 in W such that K>0, w1 = w,
wK+1 = w￿ and wkRwk+1, for k =1 ,...,K, is indicated by wRKw￿.
A binary relation R on W is complete if and only if for any w,w￿ ∈ W
either wRw￿ or w￿Rw. A binary relation R on W is reﬂexive if and only
if for any w ∈ W, wRw. A binary relation R on W is transitive if and
only if for any w,w￿,w￿￿ ∈ W, wRw￿ and w￿Rw￿￿ implies wRw￿￿. The binary
relation ¯ R on W is said to be the transitive closure of R on W and is deﬁned
as ¯ R ≡{ (w,w￿) ∈ W2 : ∃K>0,wR Kw￿}.
4We denote with N the set of natural numbers and with R the set of real
numbers. Let X ⊆ Rm.T h es e t∂X = {x ∈ X : ∀y ∈ X \{ x},¬(y ≥ x)} is
said to be the upper frontier of X.
Let W ≡
￿∞
λ=1 Aλ whose generic element has the form w =( a1,...,a λ,...).
Let Λ ≡{ λ1,...,λ k,...}⊆N \{ 0} be a set of indices where λi ≤ λj for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ k. We denote the Λ-projection of w ∈ W with the map
πΛ : W →
￿
λ∈Λ Aλ such that πΛ(w)=( aλ1,...,a λk,...) for all w ∈ W.
Moreover, we denote with π−Λ the (N \ Λ)-projection. To simplify the no-
tation we set wΛ ≡ πΛ(w) and w−Λ ≡ π−Λ(w). Finally, whenever we write
w￿￿ =( wΛ,w￿
−Λ), with w,w￿ ∈ W, it is implicitly assumed that the compo-
nents of both wΛ and w￿
−Λ are reshuﬄed in such a way that w￿￿ ∈ W.
3 The Model
3.1 Description of the Economy
We consider an economy populated by a ﬁnite number of individuals which
we index according to the set {1,...,n}⊂N. The state space of the economy
is W ≡
￿∞
λ=1 Aλ, where each λ ∈ N refers to a diﬀerent characteristic of the
economy while the elements of the set Aλ represent the possible speciﬁcations
of the λ-th characteristic. Each state w ∈ W is therefore an ordered tuple
with countably inﬁnite elements describing the actual characteristic of the
economy (e.g., budget sets, choices of economic agents, weather conditions,
time, etc).
Without loss of generality we further assume that characteristic 1 rep-
resents the commodity bundle purchased by individual 1, characteristic 2
represents the bundle purchased by individual 2, and so on and so forth up
to characteristic n. Formally, we set A1 = ... = An = X ≡ Rm
+ where X
is interpreted as the consumption set and m as the number of commodi-
ties for which there exists a market. Notice that some markets may be
future markets. Moreover, and again without loss of generality, we assume
that characteristic (n+1) represents individual 1’s budget set, characteristic
(n + 2) represents individual 2’s budget set, and so on and so forth up to
characteristic 2n. Formally, we set An+1 = ...= A2n = B⊂2Rm
+ where each
B ∈Bis assumed to be such that if x ∈ B then for any x￿ ∈ X,0≤ x￿ ≤ x,
we have x￿ ∈ B.
Finally, for all i ∈{ 1,...,n} and w ∈ W we denote with xi(w) ≡ π{i}(w)
and Bi(w) ≡ π{n+i}(w), respectively, the bundle purchased by individual i
and the budget set of individual i under the description of the economy w.
Logically, we have that xi(w) ∈ Bi(w) for all i ∈{ 1,...,n} and w ∈ W.2
2Notice that, as in Matzkin (1991) who generalized the model of Afriat (1967), budget
sets are allowed to be non-linear and therefore prices do not explicitly appear.
53.2 Choices, Preferences and Preference Revelation
Individuals are assumed to be “pure consumers”, in the sense that they can
only choose what to consume. In other words, the choice set of individual i
coincides with Bi(w) for any w ∈ W.
Although individuals can only choose among alternatives in their budget
set, they may care, in principle, about any characteristic of the economy.
Let Λi ⊆ N \{ 0} be the set containing the indices associated with the
characteristics of the economy which individual i considers relevant – i.e., on
which i’ preferences are deﬁned. We assume that i ∈ Λi, meaning that each
individual at least cares about her own consumption. Then, i’s preferences
are deﬁned over the set πΛi(W). We denote with ￿i⊆ πΛi(W)×πΛi(W)t h e
relation representing i’s preferences. For any w,w￿ ∈ W, wΛi ￿i w￿
Λi means,
as usual, that wΛi is at least as preferred as w￿
Λi. (Again, wΛi stands for the
Λi-projection of w). When wΛi ￿i w￿
Λi and not w￿
Λi ￿i wΛi we say that i
strictly prefers wΛi over w￿
Λi and we write wΛi ￿i w￿
Λi. Furthermore, for any
w ∈ W,w er e f e rt ow−i ≡ πΛi\{i}(w) as the “relevant” circumstances faced
by individual i in the choice of xi(w) or, more brieﬂy, as i’s circumstances
of choice in w. We stress that here the term “relevant” is a shorthand to
indicate characteristics of the world over which preferences are deﬁned. We
say that the preference relation ￿i is locally non-satiated with respect to
own consumption, or Ai-locally non-satiated, if and only if for every w ∈ W
and ￿>0t h e r ee x i s t sw￿ ∈ W such that ||xi(w) − xi(w￿)|| ≤ ￿, w−i = w￿
−i,
w￿
Λi ￿i wΛi. Finally, we say that the preference relation ￿i is monotone
with respect to own consumption, or Ai-monotone, if and only if, for every
w,w￿ ∈ W, xi(w) >x i(w￿) (meaning that xi(w) is greater than xi(w￿)i n
all its components) and w−i = w￿
−i implies that wΛi ￿i w￿
Λi. Clearly, Ai-
monotonicity implies Ai-local non-satiation.
The fundamental presumption behind the mechanism of direct prefer-
ence revelation is that when an individual is given the possibility to choose
among diﬀerent alternatives she reveals, by the very act of choosing, that
what she has chosen is at least as preferred as all aﬀordable alternatives. In
other words, individuals’ constrained choices are optimal. It must be noted,
however, that direct preference revelation is limited to the relation between
what the individual has chosen and all alternatives she could have actu-
ally chosen. This implies that, in the present framework, direct preference
revelation can only rank alternatives in W that satisfy the ceteris paribus
condition with respect to circumstances of choice since individuals cannot
choose the latter. This will turn out to be the key to our results.
Our deﬁnition of an ideal set of observations regarding individuals’ choices
follows the basic idea just delineated. Let D ⊂ W be a ﬁnite set whose ele-
ments are fully descriptive observations of the economy. We say that D is an
ideal dataset if D ⊂ W and for every w ∈ D and i ∈{ 1,...,n} we have that
xi(w) ∈ ∂Bi(w). In other words, an ideal dataset contains all information
6about the state of the world and is such that individuals spend their entire
budget. The latter assumption is standard. One typical interpretation is
that D contains all possible uses of individuals’ budgets.
Note that in this context we abstract from issues of strategic behavior
and beliefs which are not central to this study. In this way we put ourselves
in the most favorable situation in terms of observational information about
individuals’ preferences. This will help to highlight the purely logical nature
of our ﬁndings.3
The binary relation Ri ⊆ πΛi(D) × πΛi(W) denotes i’s directly revealed
preferences. For every w ∈ D and w￿ ∈ W, wΛiRiw￿
Λi if and only if
w−i = w￿
−i and xi(w￿) ∈ Bi(w). In other terms, under the hypothesis that
individual i considers relevant the characteristics of the economy identiﬁed
by Λi, the observation of w ∈ D directly reveals that wΛi is preferred to w￿
Λi
by individual i if and only if i’s circumstances of choice in w and w￿ are the
same and i could have chosen w￿ under the circumstances of choice faced
in w. We emphasize that the requirement of equal circumstances of choice
makes Ri crucially depend on the speciﬁcation of Λi.
4 Rationalization of Observed Choices
Given an ideal dataset D ⊂ W, we say that the behavior of individual i
is rationalizable under Λi if and only if there exists a preference relation
￿i⊆ πΛi(W) × πΛi(W) satisfying
R1. transitiveness and completeness
R2. wΛiRiw￿
Λi ⇒ wΛi ￿i w￿
Λi.
We say that an ideal dataset D ⊂ W is rationalizable under {Λi}n
i=1 if there
exists a collection of preference relations {￿i}n
i=1 such that the behavior of
each i can be rationalized.
Lemma 1 Let D ⊂ W be an ideal dataset and let Ri ⊆ πΛi(D)×πΛi(W) be
the directly revealed preferences of individual i under Λi. Then, the following
conditions are equivalent:
i) the behavior of individual i can be rationalized by a preference relation
which satisﬁes Ai-local non-satiation,
ii) wΛi ¯ Riw￿
Λi and w￿
ΛiRiwΛi imply that xi(w) ∈ ∂Bi(w￿),
iii) the behavior of individual i can be rationalized by a preference relation
which satisﬁes Ai-monotonicity.
3For a discussion of the shortcomings of preference revelation in the presence of strategic
behavior see Hausman (2000). Other insightful comments on related issues can be found
in Varian (2006).
7Proof. We will show that i) ⇒ ii) ⇒ iii) ⇒ i).
We ﬁrst show that i) ⇒ ii). Suppose that the behavior of individual i is
rationalized by the preference relation ￿i⊆ πΛi(W)×πΛi(W) which satisﬁes
Ai-local non-satiation. Consider w,w￿ ∈ W. We will show that jointly
having that wΛi ¯ Riw￿
Λi, w￿
ΛiRiwΛi and xi(w) ∈ Bi(w￿)\∂Bi(w￿) is impossible.
Since ￿i rationalizes i’s behavior we have three cases: 1) wΛi ￿i w￿
Λi, 2)
w￿
Λi ￿i wΛi, or 3) wΛi ￿i w￿
Λi and w￿
Λi ￿i wΛi. If 1) holds then by R2 we
have that not w￿
Λi ￿i wΛi implies not w￿
ΛiRiwΛi. If 2) holds then by R1
(transitivity) we have that there exists no natural K>0 such that wΛi ￿K
i
w￿
Λi. In particular this implies that for any sequence {(wk,w k+1)}K
k=1 in W2
with w1 = w and wK+1 = w￿, there exists at least one natural k such that
((wk)Λi,(wk+1)Λi) / ∈￿i. Hence, by R2 and the fact that D ⊂ W we have
that for every sequence {(wk,w k+1)}K
k=1 in D2 with w1 = w and wK+1 =
w￿, there exists at least one natural k such that ((wk)Λi,(wk+1)Λi) / ∈ Ri
which in turn implies that wΛi ¯ Riw￿
Λi is impossible. Finally, suppose that
3) holds and that w￿
ΛiRiwΛi. By the deﬁnition of Ri we have that xi(w) ∈
Bi(w￿) and that w￿
−i = w−i.B y Ai-local non-satiation we have that if
xi(w) ∈ Bi(w￿) \ ∂Bi(w￿)t h e nt h e r ee x i s t sw￿￿ such that: xi(w￿￿) ∈ Bi(w￿),
w￿￿
−i = w−i, w￿￿
Λi ￿i wΛi; by R1 (transitivity and completeness) this would
imply that w￿
Λi ￿i wΛi which contradicts ii). We therefore conclude that
xi(w) ∈ ∂Bi(w￿). Hence, if the behavior of i is rationalized by a preference
relation which satisﬁes Ai-local non-satiation, then wΛi ¯ Riw￿
Λi and w￿
ΛiRiwΛi
imply that xi(w) ∈ ∂Bi(w￿).
We show that ii) ⇒ iii) in two steps. In the ﬁrst step we show that,
if ii) holds, then we can construct a transitive and reﬂexive preference re-
lation containing ¯ Ri which satisﬁes Ai-monotonicity. In step two we apply
a standard result which guarantees the extendibility of the relation con-
structed in step one to a transitive and complete preference relation which
preserves Ai-monotonicity. Suppose that wΛi ¯ Riw￿
Λi and w￿
ΛiRiwΛi imply
that xi(w) ∈ ∂Bi(w￿). Deﬁne the binary relation Li ≡{ (wΛ−i,w￿
Λ−i) ∈




−i))}. Let Hi ≡ Li ∪ ¯ Ri. By construction, Hi is both transitive and reﬂex-
ive and is a subset of πΛi(D) × πΛi(W). Suppose that Hi does not satisfy
Ai-monotonicity. Since, by construction, xi(w) >x i(w￿) and w−i = w￿
−i im-
ply that (wΛi,w￿
Λi) ∈ Hi, we conclude that there exists u,v ∈ W such that
xi(u) >x i(v), u−i = v−i and (vΛi,u Λi) ∈ Hi. This means that there exists,
for some natural K>0, a sequence {((wk)Λi,(wk+1)Λi)}K
k=1 ⊆ Li ∪ ¯ Ri such
that w1 = v and wK+1 = u.S i n c e ( ( w)Λi,(w￿)Λi) ∈ Li ∪ ¯ Ri implies that
w−i = w￿
−i, we have that (wk)−i =( wk+1)−i for every 1 ≤ k ≤ K; therefore,
the whole sequence {((wk)Λi,(wk+1)Λi)}K
k=1 cannot be contained in Li oth-
erwise we would have that xi(v) >x i(u). In particular, since xi(u) >x i(v),
there must exist a subsequence {((wk)Λi,(wk+1)Λi)}l
k=j,1≤ j ≤ k ≤ l ≤ K,
which is a subset of ¯ Ri, such that (wj)Λi ¯ Ri(wl+1)Λi and xi(wj) <x i(wl+1).
8Since (wj)Λi ¯ Ri(wl+1)Λi implies that (wk)ΛiRi(wk+1)Λi for l ≤ k ≤ j,w e
have that xi(wk+1) ∈ Bi(wk) for l ≤ k ≤ j. From xi(wl+1) ∈ Bi(wl),
xi(wj) <x i(wl+1) and the deﬁnition of budget sets follows that xi(wj) ∈
Bi(wl)\∂Bi(wl) which in turn implies that (wl)ΛiRi(wj)Λi. This contradicts
our initial assumption because we have that (wj)Λi ¯ Ri(wl)Λi,( wl)ΛiRi(wj)Λi
and xi(wj) ∈ Bi(wl) \ ∂Bi(wl). Hence, Hi satisﬁes Ai-monotonicity. Since
Hi is both transitive and reﬂexive we can apply the result by Hansson (1968)
(Lemma 3) which establishes the extendibility of Hi to a complete and tran-
sitive relation HE
i ⊃ Hi such that if wΛiHiw￿
Λi and not w￿
ΛiHiwΛi,t h e n
wΛiHE
i w￿
Λi and not w￿
ΛiHE
i wΛi.4 The latter property implies that if Hi sat-
isﬁes Ai-monotonicity then also HE
i satisﬁes Ai-monotonicity. This proves
that the behavior of individual i can be rationalized by a preference relation
which satisﬁes Ai-monotonicity.
Finally, the fact that iii) ⇒ i) trivially follows from the fact that Ai-
monotonicity implies Ai-local non-satiation.￿
Remark 1. Because of budget set non-linearity, we cannot extend the result
of Lemma 1 to Ai-strong monotonicity – i.e., for any w,w￿ ∈ W such that
w−i = w￿
−i, xi(w) ≥ xi(w￿) and xi(w) ￿= xi(w￿) imply that w￿
Λi ￿i wΛi.I n
fact, we could have w,w￿ ∈ D such that w−i = w￿
−i, xi(w) ≥ xi(w￿) and
xi(w) ￿= xi(w￿) implying that wΛiRiw￿
Λi and wΛiRiw￿
Λi which is incompatible
with Ai-strong monotonicity (this is also evident in the light of the results
of Richter (1966) and Matzkin (1991) which show that rationalizability by
means of standard strong monotonic preferences is attainable only if the
strong axiom of revealed preferences is satisﬁed).
We are now ready to study the rationalizability of an ideal dataset under
the hypothesis that every individual considers the set of all possible budget
sets a relevant characteristic of the economy.
Proposition 1 Let D ⊂ W be an ideal dataset. If n + i ∈ Λi for every
individual i then D is rationalizable by a collection of preferences such that
the preferences of each individual i satisfy Ai-monotonicity.
Proof. Consider individual i ∈{ 1,...,n}.I f wΛi ¯ Riw￿
Λi then there ex-
ists a sequence {((wk)Λi,(wk+1)Λi)}K
k=1,w h e r ew1 = w, wK+1 = w￿ and
1 ≤ k ≤ K, such that (wk)ΛiRi(wk+1)Λi. The latter condition implies
that (wk)−i =( wk+1)−i for every k and, in particular, w−i = w￿
−i.S i n c e
the (n + i)-th characteristic referes to i’s budget set, from n + i ∈ Λi and
w−i = w￿
−i we get that Bi(w)=Bi(w￿). Hence, by budget exhaustion
we have that xi(w),x i(w￿) ∈ ∂Bi(w)=∂Bi(w￿). This implies that having
both wΛi ¯ Riw￿
Λi and w￿
ΛiRiwΛi implies xi(w￿) ∈ ∂Bi(w). By Lemma 1 we
4See also Suzumura (1976, 1983) (theorem 3, theorem A(5)), Donaldson and Weymark
(1998) (theorem), Duggan (1999), (application C).
9get rationalizability of i’s behavior by means of Ai-monotone preferences.
Applying this reasoning to every individual gives the result.￿
Proposition 1 states that the hypothesis that individuals consider their bud-
get sets relevant characteristics of the economy is a suﬃcient condition to
make any ﬁnite set of ideal observations of individuals’ choices rationalizable
by means of a collection of transitive and complete preferences which are
monotone (or locally non-satiated) in own consumption. Next Proposition
states that such a hypothesis is also a necessary condition.
Proposition 2 If n+i/ ∈ Λi for some individual i then there exists an ideal
dataset D ⊂ W which is not rationalizable by a collection of preferences such
that the preferences of individual i satisfy Ai-local non-satiation.
Proof. We prove the Proposition by showing that if n + i/ ∈ Λi for some
individual i ∈{ 1,...,n} then there exists a ﬁnite ideal dataset ˜ D such
that i’s revealed preferences do not satisfy statement ii) of Lemma 1 and,
hence, i’s behavior cannot be rationalized by a preference relation satisfying
Ai-local non-satiation. Suppose that n + i/ ∈ Λi. Consider the behavior
of individual i in the dataset ˜ D ≡{ w,w￿}⊂W such that w−i = w￿
−i.
Notice that, under the hypothesis that n+ i/ ∈ Λi, such a dataset is feasible
independently of what are the other elements of Λi besides i; moreover,
provided that xi(w) ∈ ∂Bi(w) and xi(w￿) ∈ ∂Bi(w￿), the budget sets Bi(w)
and Bi(w￿) can be set freely. Suppose that xi(w￿) ∈ Bi(w￿) ∩ (Bi(w) \
∂Bi(w)). Hence, by the deﬁnition of preference revelation, we get that that
wΛiRiw￿
Λi, w￿
ΛiRiwΛi and xi(w￿) ∈ Bi(w) \ ∂Bi(w)w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s
that statement ii) of Lemma 1 is false.￿
Remark 2. Together Lemma 1, Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 imply that
rationalizability by means of either Ai-local non-satiated or Ai-monotone
preferences obtains for every ﬁnite ideal dataset if and only if the preferences
of every individual depend on her own budget set.
Remark 3. In Proposition 2, the set Λi may contain inﬁnitely many char-
acteristics of the economy and some of these may depend on actual budget
sets. Hence, we have also proved that assuming that individuals’ preferences
depend on characteristics of the economy which in turn depend on budget
sets does not lead to the rationalizability of every ﬁnite ideal dataset.
As stated in Remark 3, the fact that individuals’ preferences depend on
some characteristic of the economy that depend on actual budget sets does
not logically prevent rationalizability by means of Ai-non satiated (or Ai-
monotone) preferences. However, one may wonder about the diﬃcultly of
obtaining the failure of rationalizability under such a hypothesis. In order
10to shed some light on this issue we ﬁnd useful to investigate an instance
of this assumption. More precisely, we consider the case where individuals
only care about their own and others’ consumption choices, budget sets are
linear and all individuals face the same price vector. Clearly, we can apply
Proposition 2 because (n + i) / ∈ Λi for every i. Moreover, since others’ con-
sumption choices depend on actual prices, this case satisﬁes the hypothesis
that preferences are deﬁned over characteristics of the economy (other than
own consumption) which depend on actual budgets sets. It turns out that
in such a case rationalizability can fail only if a rather strong condition is
met.
Let us denote with ˆ W the state space of an economy where the following
assumptions hold. First, A2n+1 = ... = A3n+1 = Rm
+. Second, for every
i ∈{ 1,...,n} and w ∈ ˆ W, ∂Bi(w)={x ∈ X :0≤ p(w)x = p(w)ei(w)}
where ei(w) ≡ π{2n+i}(w) and p(w) ≡ π{3n+i}(w)r e p r e s e n t ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
the vector of endowments of individual i and the vector of ruling prices.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Λj = {1,...,n} for every individual j. Then,
a ﬁnite ideal dataset D ⊂ ˆ W is not rationalizable by a collection of prefer-
ences, such that the preferences of each individual j satisfy Aj-monotonicity,
only if there exists i ∈{ 1,...,n} and w,w￿ ∈ D such that p(w) ￿= p(w￿),
p(w)xi(w) >p (w)xi(w￿) and xj(w)=xj(w￿) for all j ￿= i.
Proof. Suppose that the claimed necessary condition is not satisﬁed, i.e.,
that for every w,w￿ ∈ W and i ∈{ 1,...,n},e i t h e r
(a) p(w)=p(w￿) or
(b) p(w)xi(w) ≤ p(w)xi(w￿) or
(c) xj(w) ￿= xj(w￿) for some j ￿= i.
We will show that statement ii) of Lemma 1 is satisﬁed for every i ∈
{1,...,n}. Suppose that w￿
Λi
¯ RiwΛi. If (b) holds then we obtain that
wΛiRiw￿
Λi only if p(w)xi(w)=p(w)xi(w￿) which implies that xi(w￿) ∈
∂Bi(w), consistently with statement ii) of Lemma 1. If (c) holds then
w−i ￿= w￿
−i and, hence, we have not wΛiRiw￿
Λi which, again, is consistent
with statement ii) of Lemma 1. Now consider the case where (a) holds. If
p(w)xi(w) ≤ p(w￿)xi(w￿)=p(w)xi(w￿) then we are in case (b). Suppose,
instead, that p(w)xi(w) >p (w)xi(w￿). We will show that this implies that
there exist two elements of ˆ W which satisfy neither (a), (b), nor (c). Since
w￿
Λi
¯ RiwΛi,t h e r ee x i s t sas e q u e n c e{((wk)Λi,(wk+1)Λi)}K
k=1 in ˆ W × ˆ W,w i t h
w1 = w￿, wK+1 = w and 1 ≤ k ≤ K, such that (wk)ΛiRi(wk+1)Λi and
wk
−j = wk+1
−j for every j ￿= i. This implies that, for every k, wk and wk+1
do not satisfy condition (c). Moreover, p(wk)xi(wk) ≥ p(wk)xi(wk+1). In
particular, p(w￿)xi(w￿) ≥ p(w￿)xi(w2). Since p(w)=p(w￿) and p(w)xi(w) >
11p(w)xi(w￿), we obtain that p(w)xi(w) >p (w)xi(w2) which implies that con-
dition (b) is not satisﬁed by w and w2.I fw and w2 do not satisfy (a) we are
done. If they do, then p(w)=p(w2) and we can apply the same reasoning
applied so far to get that p(w)xi(w) >p (w)xi(w3) and so on and so forth.
Since K is ﬁnite and p(w)xi(w) >p (w)xi(w) is impossible, we necessarily
get that there exists some k such that wk and wk+1 satisfy neither (a), (b),
nor (c).￿
Remark 4. From the necessary condition stated in Proposition 3 and
budget exhaustion follows that if ej(w)=ej(w￿)t h e nej(w)=xj(w)=
xj(w￿). Therefore, an ideal ﬁnite dataset whose elements are constants over
individuals’ endowments can fail to be rationalized only if everybody but
one ﬁnd optimal to consume their endowments under two diﬀerent price
systems.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have proved that the dependency of preferences on budget
sets is both necessary and suﬃcient for making every fully informative and
ﬁnite set of observed consumption choices rationalizable by a collection of
preferences which are transitive, complete, and monotone with respect to
own consumption.
We believe that our result is important in two main respects, one re-
lated to suﬃciency and the other to necessity. As regards suﬃciency, our
ﬁnding shows that economic models where preferences are assumed to be
price-dependent are methodologically problematic under the scientiﬁc com-
mitments of revealed preference theory. Indeed, our result indicates that,
if we want to have a model with price-dependent preferences which could
be possibly rejected by (fully informative) observation, then we have to add
restrictions on behavior which do not derive from rational choice theory
alone. For what concerns necessity, our result shows that price-independent
preferences ensure that the hypothesis of rational behavior always produces
implications which can be rejected by (fully informative) observation, no
matter how extravagant we allow preferences to be. This conclusion sug-
gests that modelers may consider the extension of the domain of preferences
beyond consumption more benevolently since, as long as we maintain price-
independence, letting preferences depend on other observable objects is not
illegitimate under the scientiﬁc commitments of revealed preference theory.
We stress that these considerations are fundamentally logical, abstract-
ing from practical issues of testability. As we have shown in the paper, a
model which provides testable implications from a logical standpoint may
well be untestable in practice. We therefore call for great caution in the
interpretation of our results.
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